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NOTES AND COMMENTS
notwithstanding his or her fault." Also, in the majority of states,
alimony may be awarded in an action for absolute divorce.'" There-
fore, the husband may obtain a divorce even though the wife has not
previously obtained an alimony decree.'"
Although the North Carolina court may be achieving desirable
results under its present policies, it is not the function of the court
to determine what the social policy should be in an area in which
the legislature has already made such determination. Since the
legislature has provided in express terms that a divorce shall be
granted after two years separation, the court should not qualify
this in order to carry out another policy-that of protecting the
wife's right to support from her husband rather than from society.
It is submitted that the legislature should amend our statutes to
permit an award of alimony in an action for absolute divorce. This
will permit the court to carry out both social policies and at the
same time adhere to the express mandate of the two years separation
statute.
BORDEN R. HALLOWES
Domestic Relations-Divorce and Adoption-Residence Requirement
for Servicemen
Acquisition by service personnel of a domicile of choice has for
many years presented vexing quandaries both to lawyers and to
legislatures. For example, questions as to domicile may be of
critical importance in resolving problems encountered by servicemen
in such diverse areas as taxation,' establishment of voting rights in
11".g., Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933); Sandlin
v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W.2d 635 (1942) ; Best v. Best, 218 Ky. 648,
291 S.W. 1032 (1927) ; Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946) ;
Bernard v. Jefferson, 191 La. 881, 186 So. 599 (1939); Lemp v. Lemp, 62
Nev. 91, 141 P.2d 212 (1943).
" Northcutt v. Northcutt, 262 Ala. 98, 77 So. 2d 336 (1955) ; Schiebe v.
Schiebe, 57 Cal. App. 2d 336, 134 P.2d 835 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943) ; Weintraub
v. Weintraub, 302 N.Y. 104, 96 N.E.2d 724 (1951); Hyde v. McCoart, 82
R.I. 426, 110 A.2d 658 (1955).
"Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512 (1921) ; Rylands v.
Rylands, 65 Ariz. 97, 174 P.2d 741 (1946); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12,
41 P.2d 1059 (1935); Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200
(1947).
1 See Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937). See
generally Baer, So Your Client Wants A Divorce, 24 N.C.L. Rrv. 1, 14
& n.55 (1945).
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a particular location,2 adoption3 or guardianship.4 Divorce cases,
however, constitute possibly the largest single source of litigation
involving determination of the place of domicile of military per-
sonnel.
The basic statutory provision in North Carolina respecting
jurisdictional prerequisites in divorce actions" requires that the
plaintiff allege that the complainant or defendant has been a resident
of this state for at least six months next preceding the filing of the
complaint. The North Carolina Supreme Court in construing this
statutory mandate has interpreted the word "resident" to mean
"domicile," thereby necessitating concomitance of residence and
animus manendi.'
In apparent recognition of the confusion engendered by applica-
tion of this jurisdictional requirement in instances where one of the
parties to the action was in military service the General Assembly in
1959 enacted G.S. § 50-181 which provides,
In any action instituted and prosecuted under this chapter
[Divorce and Alimony], allegation and proof that the plaintiff
or the defendant has resided or been stationed at a United
States army, navy, marine corps, coast guard or air force
installation or reservation or any other location pursuant
to military duty within this State for a period of six months
next preceding the institution of the action shall constitute
compliance with the residence requirement set forth in this
chapter ....
It seems permissible to assume that the legislature was aware of
the interpretation that the North Carolina Supreme Court had
placed on the provisions of the existing jurisdictional statute.8 Thus,
enactment of G.S. § 50-18 seems clearly to evince legislative intent
to authorize the granting of a divorce to a serviceman upon a show-
2 See, e.g., Estopinal v. Michel, 121 La. 879, 46 So. 907 (1908); Dorsey
v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N.E. 303 (1898).
'See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 94 Ind. App. 619, 180 N.E. 188 (1932);
Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 199 S.E. 677 (1938).
" See, e.g., McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945);
Beringer v. Beringer, 164 Misc. 413, 298 N.Y. Supp. 965 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1937).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (Supp. 1959).
SBryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-18 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (Supp. 1959).
[Vol. 40
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ing of something less than domicile as a basis for jurisdiction.9
Perhaps the presence of a substantial number of military bases in
North Carolina, expectably resulting in a high percentage of divorce
actions involving servicemen, motivated this apparent attempt to
reduce the existing jurisdictional requirement. Other jurisdictions
have enacted similar statutes,10 and still others have statutes which
employ language seemingly broad enough to authorize divorce juris-
diction, under certain circumstances, without a finding of domicile."
From the serviceman's point of view, the desirability of such statu-
tory allowance is obvious; utilization of provisions of this nature
would circumvent the extreme inconvenience he would encounter if
forced to initiate an action in his "home" state.'2
Historically, divorce has been regarded as an action in rem, and
domicile has been considered the core of divorce jurisdiction."
Unfortunately, however, the United States Supreme Court never has
ruled on the precise question of whether some other relationship
between the state and litigants will provide an allowable foundation
for the judicial power to grant divorces. Judicial opinion has
divided sharply as to the effect of statutes purporting to authorize
divorce jurisdiction on a basis other than domicile: some courts
have regarded such legislative action valid to confer jurisdiction,' 4
while others have espoused the view that domicile is the only per-
' For a full exploration of the probable intent underlying enactment of this
statutory section, see Ligon, Is Domicile a Jurisdictional Prerequisite to a
Valid Divorce Decree?, 3 JAG J. 9 (1961).
"°GA. CODE ANN. § 30-107 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1502 (1949); NED. REV. STAT. § 42-303 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4
(1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (1961); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4631 (1960) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (1960).
"See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (Supp. 1961); CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-1-3 (1954); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 166-55 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICE AcT § 1166.
" Aside from additional expense, probably the greatest obstacle in this
respect would be obtention of a furlough to coincide with the time of trial.
"3 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181
U.S. 175 (1901).
"'Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) ; Schaeffer v.
Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629, 266 P.2d 282 (1954) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M.
414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807
(1959). Cf. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d
649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Many writers argue that the mandatory requirement of domicile is un-
desirable. See, e.g., COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 463 (1942); Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition
of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1951);
Lorzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II, 54 YALE
L.J. 799 (1945).
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missible jurisdictional predicate.'5 Since ample legal authority exists
to support either view,"0 there could only be speculation as to the
position the North Carolina Supreme Court would adopt with refer-
ence to the provisions of G.S. § 50-18. The recent case of Martin
v. Martin17 provides the answer.
In Martin, the plaintiff-husband, a United States Army officer,
was assigned to Fort Bragg in July 1958, and served there con-
tinuously until August 1959. On July 6, 1959, he instituted an
action for absolute divorce on the ground of two years' separation,
and alleged that he had been a resident on the Fort Bragg Military
Reservation for more than six months next preceding the commence-
ment of the action. The defendant-wife, who was present at the
trial, contended that the residence requirement set out in G.S.
§ 50-18 involved domicile and averred that the plaintiff did not
intend to make North Carolina his permanent home.
In evident reliance upon G.S. § 50-18, the trial judge instructed
the jury that if they found that the plaintiff had been stationed at
Fort Bragg pursuant to military duty for six months prior to the
bringing of the action, they should answer the issue of residence in
favor of the plaintiff. The defendant excepted to this charge. The
jury found for the plaintiff and judgment was entered in accordance
with the verdict.
On appeal this portion of the charge was held erroneous in that
it omitted the "requirement of intent to adopt North Carolina as legal
residence,""' and accordingly a new trial was awarded. Thus the
court imported to the specialized provisions of G.S. § 50-18 the exact
interpretation of residence requirement established under the basic
statute applicable to divorce jurisdiction. Several cases 9 from other
jurisdictions that had vigorously denied effect to similar statutes
which sought to establish jurisdictional bases for divorce on grounds
other than domicile were cited with approval in the opinion. Al-
though decisions 0 that had held valid such statutory provisions were
"Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (dictum); Alton v.
Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36
So. 2d 236 (1948). See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 396
(3d ed. 1949); RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 111 (1934).
"8 For an excellent discussion that marshals the authorities supporting
each side of this controversy, see 38 N.C.L. REv. 154, 176-87 (1959).
17253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961).
i81d. at 710, 118 S.E2d at 34.
'9 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Jennings v. Jennings, 251
Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948)."o Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936) ; Wallace v. Wallace,
(Vol. 40
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alluded to, the court expressly disapproved the conclusion reached by
these cases and stated, "We hold that-in order for the courts of this
State to exercise jurisdiction affecting, the rhatital status, at least
one of the parties to the action must be domiciled in the State. Mere
presence is insufficient."'" This broad language seems effectively
to sound the death knell for application of G.S. § 50-18 along the
lines of the presumptive legislative intent underlying its enactment,
i.e., relaxation of the stringent "domiciliary" residence requirement
in cases where a serviceman is a party to the divorce action.
In an effort to ascribe some effect to the statute involved the
court stated that it regarded G.S. § 50-18 as "an expression of policy
by the General Assembly that. a serviceman stationed on a military
reservation in the State is capable of establishing his domicile in
North Carolina."2'  Upon examination of the language employed
in the statute, however, .such a construction seems strained. , Cer-
tainly there is nothing in. the statute to imply that its application was
intended to be limited to servicemen actually living on a military
post who would thereby be under.United States jurisdiction rather
than that of the state. By express provision, the statute was designed
to extend to servicemen located anywhere ,in- North Carolina pur-
suant to military service. If the legislature had only intended that
the statute should -authorize the establishment of- domicile within the
state by armed forces personnel living on a military reservation, -n-
bodiment of, such language is unexplainable.
As has been pointed out, the holdirg in Martin aborted an
apparent attempt to confer divorce jurisdiction upon a basis other
than legally defined domicile. This pb.sitior ' may be justified in the
light of traditional views regarding divorce" (i) dissolution of a
marriage dhanr~ges the status of the parties and thus touches the
basic interests of society, and (2)_ domicile. alone provides an inter-
.63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (195$.. The:controlling, premise in these cases
was that since no definitive authority exists to establish domicile as the sole
permissible basis for divorce jurisdiction it -was withinrthe power of the
legislature to set other reasonable7 jurisdictional bases. ,,
21253 N.C. at 709, 118 S.E.2d at 31.
'2IbNd. Conversely, theNorth Carolina Supreme Court recently held that
a serviceman's domicile within the state is not lost merely because he leaves
pursuant to military service: Rather, his d6 micile remains'in the home state
unless he takes appropriate action to effect a change. Israel v. Israel,. 255
N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).
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connection between the state and the parties sufficient to authorize
control of such significant legal relations.23
The considerations discussed above would seem to be as
applicable to adoption as to divorce since an adoption also affects
status.24  This raises an interesting legal problem. In order to
adopt a child in North Carolina, it is required by statute that the
adopting parent be a resident of this state.25 If the legislature may
not base divorce jurisdiction on something less than domicile, does
it necessarily follow that the same would hold true in the case of
adoption? If so, is the validity of some of the adoptions by service-
men now in jeopardy?
Attacks upon adoption usually are made in one of two general
forms: motion to vacate the decree26 or habeas corpus proceeding
for custody of the child. 7 In either proceeding the decisive question
is whether the court which rendered the decree had jurisdiction.
Since adoption is not a common law action, the jurisdiction must
be accorded by statute. Widely differing views have been advanced
by courts as to the proper interpretation to be placed on the word
"resident" (or "resides") as it appears in various adoption statutes.
Although the better view would seem to be allowance of adoption on
the basis of residence in the ordinary sense,2" there is authority for
the proposition that residence as included within a particular adop-
tion statute must be interpreted to mean domicile.3"
" See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901)." There seems to be a more or less inchoate notion that adoption operates
in rem or quasi in rem, though agreement as to the identity of the res and as
to its situs does not exist. For an exhaustive treatment of the cases in this
area and the underlying rationale of the decisions, see Taintor, Adoption in
the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. PirT. L. REv. 222 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. SAT. § 48-4 (1950).
" See, e.g., Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 393 (1942) ; Nealon
v. Farris, 131 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939); Strode v. Silverman,
209 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
"See, e.g., Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943); Watt v.
Dunn, 236 Iowa 67, 17 N.W.2d 811 (1945); Brooks v. De Witt, 178 S.W.2d
718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
"  Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal. App. 137, 256 Pac. 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
See generally PEcK, Tr. LAW OF PERSoNS AND DOMEsTic RELATioNS 352
(3d ed. 1930).
" Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921); Van Matre v.
Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N.E. 628 (1893); Succession of Caldwell, 114 La.
195, 38 So. 140 (1905); Waller v. Ellis, 169 Md. 15, 179 Atl. 289 (1935);
In re Adoption of Russell, 170 Pa. Super. 358, 85 A.2d 878 (1952).
"In re Webb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 177 P.2d 222 (1947); In re
Goodman, 49 Del. 550, 121 A.2d 676 (Orphans' Ct. 1952); Johnson v.
[Vol. 40
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled on the question, it appears that a decree of adoption, rendered
with proper jurisdiction and without fraud on the court, is entitled
to normal full faith and credit protection for all purposes.3' But
such a judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive
or final effect in a sister state than in the rendering state.3 2 Before
grantifig full faith and credit to the decree, a sister state may demand
proof that the adoptions were valid under the law-of the state grant-
ing the adoption.3 3
Since the North Carolina court has never had occasion to in-
terpret the word "residence" in our adoption statute, it would be
unfortunate if a sister state should seize upon the decision in Martin
as a basis for refusing to give full faith and credit to a child adopted
by a serviceman in North Carolina. Until either the United States
Supreme Court or the North Carolina Supreme Court interprets
residence in regard to adoption, an attorney would be well advised
to get into the record evidence sufficient to support a finding of bona
fide domicile of the adopting parent. And in cases where it is clear
that the adopting parents are not domiciled in North Carolina, it
would seem advisable for the attorney to inform them of the possible
"pitfalls" that they might face later.
C. EDWIN ALLMAN, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Deductibility of Meal and Lodging
Expenses as Medical Care
It is probable that during any given year a large number of
people in the United States will encounter sickness or injury and
will be advised by their physician to take a trip entiriely for medical
treatment. Since certain medical expenses are deductible for income
tax purposes,' there arises a question as to what trip expenses may
be properly classified as a medical care deduction. This is especially
true when the taxpayer is not confined to a hospital or other in-
stitution and is accompanied on the trip by his wife and, possibly,
Smith, 94 Ind. App. 619, 180 N.E. 188 (1932); Heirich v. Howe, 50 N.M.
90, 171 P.2d 312 (1946) ; Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 199 S.E. 677 (1938)." 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICr OF LAWS: A ComPAPATivw STUDY 645 (1945);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS § 143 (1934).
'* New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614 . (1947).
Welkh v. Jacobsmeyer, 216 La. 334, 43 So. 2d 678 (1949).
INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §213(a).
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